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Race and Gender on the Bench: How Best to
Achieve Diversity in Judicial Selection
Constance A. Anastopoulo* and Daniel J. Crooks III†
ABSTRACT

How can states increase diversity on the bench? This article begins by presuming
that increasing racial and gender diversity is a worthy goal—among other positive
results, a diverse bench increases the judicial system’s perceived legitimacy by
increasing a diverse citizenry’s confidence that judges will treat them fairly and
impartially. Next we examine the unique judicial selection systems of South Carolina and
Virginia—where the entire process is controlled exclusively by the state legislature—and
reach the counterintuitive conclusion that these systems actually increase judicial
diversity very effectively when compared with the systems of other states. Finally, we
propose four specific reforms to improve the already effective systems in South Carolina
and Virginia: (1) preclude sitting legislators from membership, at least in the majority,
on any merit selection commission; (2) raise the cap in South Carolina on the number of
qualified applicants submitted to the General Assembly from the current three to at least
ten, or in Virginia place a reasonable limit on the number of names submitted to the
legislative delegation from which they may select; (3) require any merit selection
commission, including the Judicial Merit Selection Committee in South Carolina, to give
“substantial weight” to ethics decisions rendered by a tribunal within the judicial
department; and (4) include the state’s Bar association in the selection process.
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“Too many Americans don’t understand the importance of minority rights and the
independent judiciary.”1
INTRODUCTION
Much has been written about the different processes of judicial selection
employed in various states throughout the country. A large amount of the focus has been
on the importance of an independent and diverse judiciary and how best to achieve these
objectives in the judicial selection process in order to ensure this result. There is a
longstanding belief that the judiciary must be structured so as to instill confidence in
citizens that court decisions will be fair and impartial.2 Much of the focus in promoting
diversity at all levels of state judiciaries has been to enhance the legitimacy of the judicial
system in the eyes of an ever-more diverse public. Demographic imbalance in the
composition of the judiciary, as well as any actual or perceived lack of independence,
may erode citizens’ confidence that judges will treat them fairly and impartially. A lack
of independence, whether actual or perceived, undermines the legitimacy of the state
court system.
When the public loses confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the courts,
justice and democracy themselves are at stake. The lack of diversity “can malign the
legitimacy of not only lawyers, but the law itself.”3 A recent report from the New York
University Brennan Center entitled Improving Judicial Diversity recognized that the
nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court in 2009 highlighted the
*
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Douglas E. Abrams, Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law.
2
CIARA TORES-SPELLISCY ET AL., IMPROVING JUDICIAL DIVERSITY 4 (Brennan Center for Justice ed., 2nd
ed. 2010).
3
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DIVERSITY AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION: THE NEXT STEPS 31 (Cie
Armstead ed., A.B.A. Presidential Initiative Commission on Diversity 2010).
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issue of diversity, particularly gender, on the bench.4 The report noted that as Sotomayor
proceeded through the nomination process, attention was focused on the fact that “of 111
Supreme Court Justices in the Court’s history since 1789, 106 have been white men.”5
Sotomayor was only the third person of color and only the third woman appointed to
serve in the Court’s 221-year history.6 Her nomination keenly illustrated the lack of
diversity on the country’s highest court. More importantly, her nomination suggested
that the problem with respect to state courts may be even greater.7
Despite the fact that women now comprise forty-eight percent of law school
graduates and forty-five percent of law firm associates, they make up only twenty-six
percent of state judiciaries and twenty-two percent of the federal judiciary.8 To be sure,
some progress has been made. For example, twenty states across the nation now have a
woman serving as chief justice of their highest court, a number higher than at any other
time in the history of the United States.9 Nevertheless, evidence in states such as South
Carolina suggests a broader problem on the circuit, or lower-level, courts. These courts
handle the bulk of cases in the court system and serve a broad range of constituencies.
Conversely, appellate courts are more removed from the litigants who are at the heart of
the legal system. Therefore, while gains have been made in terms of diversity in the
appellate courts, there is still much work to be done in the lower-level courts.
According to the 2010 Brennan Center report, most judiciaries do not reflect the
diversity in their states.10 Unfortunately, there are no simple answers to the problem
posed by the lack of diversity in the judiciary. One challenge arises from the fact that
judges are not selected in a uniform manner on the state level. Most states employ a
system of either merit selection, such as Florida or Maryland, or judicial election, such as
North Carolina or Georgia. However, both systems are equally challenged when it comes
to addressing the issue of diversity on the bench. Moreover, other states employ a hybrid
of the two systems—such as the “Missouri Plan”—that raises separate and distinct
concerns. Another challenge to improving diversity on the bench lies in the fact that
“few states have systematic recruitment efforts to attract diverse judicial applicants.”11
Beyond the problem posed by the type of selection process employed, many states
do not use a transparent selection system. This lack of transparency contributes to a
limited pool of applicants for judicial positions because lawyers are reticent to leave their
practices to enter a system where both the application and the interview processes are
unknown.12 Similarly, judicial salaries are well below those found in the private sector,
particularly for minorities who are highly valued by their firms. This substantial salary
cut further limits the pool of quality female and minority candidates for judicial
positions.13 Finally, there is the issue of politics in the selection process. As the political
4

TORES-SPELLISCY, supra note 2, at iv (Foreword).
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
FORSTER-LONG, LLC, AMERICAN BENCH: JUDGES OF THE NATION 2 (2012).
9
Mark Curriden, Tipping the Scales, A.B.A. J., July 1, 2010, http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article
/tipping_the_scales/.
10
TORES-SPELLISCY, supra note 2, at iv.
11
Id. at 2.
12
Id. at 3.
13
Id. at 5.
5
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pendulum swings, the prioritization of diversity on the bench is affected. These are just a
few of the challenges facing the efforts to ensure that our courts reflect the diverse makeup of their constituencies.
This article presumes that diverse and independent judiciaries are necessary and
beneficial goals. While it is important to understand these objectives, this article focuses
on the current state of judicial selection in two particular states: South Carolina and
Virginia. Both of these states have a system of judicial selection that is unique only to
them—one that is controlled exclusively by the state legislature, without input from any
other branch of government. Further, in South Carolina, the legislature serves as both the
qualifying commission and the selecting entity. While on its face, a system with limited
input would seem counterproductive to achieving diversity on the bench, when this
system is compared to other states’ judicial selection process, exclusive legislative
control has proven to be an effective method in attaining diversity. This Article suggests
reforms to this process to enhance further its ability to realize diversity in the judicial
selection process.
Part I of this article begins by examining judicial selection processes utilized
generally by states, particularly the Missouri Plan. It continues by exploring the evolution
of judicial selection in South Carolina and Virginia, ending with details about each state’s
current judicial selection systems. Part II compares and contrasts each state’s process in
order to highlight the differences and evaluate how South Carolina and Virginia compare
to other states in terms of diversity on the bench. Part III analyzes the problems
associated with the method of legislatively controlled judicial selection by reviewing a
recent South Carolina Supreme Court case addressing judicial selection in that state.
Finally, Part IV proposes reforms to the current systems utilized in each state, the
employment of any one of which would be a meaningful step forward in depoliticizing
judicial selection with the ultimate goal of achieving a more diverse bench.
I.

JUDICIAL SELECTION: GENERAL OVERVIEW:

States employ a variety of different methods to choose their judges. These
methods include filling judicial posts by direct elections (either partisan or non-partisan),
appointment by the governor with advice and consent of the state senate, or election by
the state legislature. South Carolina and Virginia employ the latter method.14 Perhaps the
most well known plan is the so-called Missouri Plan.15 This plan originated in Missouri
in 1940 and has been adopted by several states, including Alaska, Arizona, Colorado,
Iowa, and Florida to name a few.16
The Missouri Plan is a non-partisan approach that incorporates different elements
of the political system to select judges.17 Under the plan, a non-partisan qualifying
commission proposes a list of names to the governor, who in turn has sixty days to decide
whether to appoint a candidate from the list.18 If the governor fails to make a selection
14

Methods of Judicial Selection, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, http://www.judicialselection.us
/judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm?state= (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
15
See Stephen J. Ware, The Missouri Plan in National Perspective, 74 MO. L. REV. 751, 759 (2009).
16
Methods of Judicial Selection, supra note 14.
17
MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(a).
18
Id.
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within sixty days, the commission may make the selection instead.19 After one year of
service, the judge faces a retention vote during the general election by which voters
decide whether to retain the judge for his or her full term.20 If the majority of voters vote
against the judge, then the process begins all over again to fill the seat.21
The composition of the commission is an important element in the Missouri Plan.
The commission is comprised of lawyers proposed by the state bar association, citizens
selected by the governor, and the chief justice of the state’s supreme court who acts as the
chair of the commission.22 Interestingly, Iowa, a state that utilizes the Missouri Plan,
includes an additional element of requiring a gender balance on the nominating
commission.23 Further, the Missouri Plan includes voters as well, thereby incorporating
different elements—the executive, the legislature, and voters—of the political process.
By employing different components, the plan’s objective is to remove politics from the
selection procedure while utilizing a “checks and balances” approach. The use of a
checks and balances approach is significant when compared to the approach to judicial
selection in South Carolina and Virginia. A system of checks and balances is at the heart
of the separation of powers form of government adopted in the United States
Constitution, which is also enshrined as a doctrine in all state constitutions.24 Separation
of powers with clearly defined branches of government, each with its own separate and
independent powers, ensures that no branch of government becomes more powerful than
any other branch, thereby preventing an abuse of power. The lack of any system a checks
and balance would allow the legislative branch to exert too much power over the judicial
branch, creating a threat to the separation of powers.
The Missouri Plan is not without its critics, however. Some of these criticisms
include that there is too much influence by lawyers,25 too much politics in the process,
and that there is a conspicuous lack of diversity on the nominating commission, which
translates into a lack of diversity on the bench.26 As Professor Stephen J. Ware points out,
the Missouri Plan may not be the panacea many hope.27 Missouri ranks thirty-second in
terms of diversity on the bench in comparison to other states.28 Professor Ware, in his
article, The Missouri Plan in National Perspective, places states on a continuum in terms
of “elitism” based on the amount of influence exerted by bar associations in the judicial
selection process.29 Missouri ranks in the second highest tier in terms of “More Elitist,
High Bar Control,” while South Carolina and Virginia are in the second to last tier in
terms of elitism, outpaced only by states with pure contestable elections.30 Some of the
other states mentioned above that utilize the Missouri Plan for judicial selection are as
geographically diverse as Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, and Florida.31 Interestingly, Alaska
19

Id.
MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(c)(1).
21
Id.
22
MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(d).
23
IA. STAT. § 46.3.
24
U.S. CONST. art. I-III.
25
See Ware, supra note 15, at 759.
26
See TORES-SPELLISCY, supra note 2, at 6.
27
See Ware, supra note 15, at 759.
28
See infra Appendix A.
29
Ware, supra note 15, at 755.
30
Id. at 775.
31
Id. at 759.
20
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ranks fortieth in terms of diversity, Arizona is tied for twenty-first, Colorado is
fourteenth, and Florida ranks twelfth.32
Additionally, critics of the Missouri Plan note that it increasingly injects politics into
judicial selection through its use of retention elections. The survival of a judge may
depend on whether or not his or her decisions are popular with voters. Even more so,
survival may depend on whether a judge is in the “right party” at the time of the election
rather than whether a judge’s decisions are correct under the law.33 Therefore, perhaps
there is another system of judicial selection available to address the criticisms directed at
the Missouri Plan which may in fact be better suited to achieve the objectives of a more
diverse and independent judiciary, especially when employing “tweaks” to that system as
proposed in this Article.
A.
South Carolina
1.

Overview

The population of South Carolina is 66.1% Caucasian, 27.9% African American,
1.3% Asian, and 5.1% Hispanic ethnicity (independent of racial classification).34 Women
make up 51.3% of the state’s population.35 Like all other states, South Carolina’s
judiciary consists of several levels, beginning with the highest court, the South Carolina
Supreme Court.36 The Supreme Court is made up of five elected justices,37 and each
serves a ten-year term.38 The court consists of a Chief Justice and four associate
justices.39 The terms are staggered so that the legislature elects one member of the court
every two years,40 and a justice may be re-elected to any number of terms.41 The court
acts in an appellate capacity, which includes cases on certiorari from the South Carolina
Court of Appeals and seven classes of appeals directly from circuit and family court cases
that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court.42
The second highest court in the state, the Court of Appeals, is comprised of nine
judges.43 The nine judges of the Court of Appeals are arranged and elected by seat,44 and
candidates can be from any geographic region in the state.45 Each member of the Court of
32

See infra Appendix A.
Ware, supra note 15, at 772.
34
See 2010 Census Interactive Population Search – SC, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov
/2010census/popmap/ipmtext.php?fl=45 (last visited June 6, 2013).
35
Id.
36
South Carolina courts include Probate Courts and Magistrate Courts; however, these are not addressed in
this article because the process of judicial selection is different from legislative appointment.
37
Supreme Court, S.C. JUD. DEP’T, http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/supreme/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. The South Carolina Constitution is void of any mention of term limits for Supreme Court justices. See
S.C. CONST. art. V, § 3.
42
These classes include the following: cases involving the sentence of death; cases involving the
constitutionality of state law or local ordinances; cases pertaining to elections; and appeals of family court
orders related to abortion by a minor. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-8-200 (2012).
43
§ 14-8-10; see also Court of Appeals, S.C. JUD. DEP’T, http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/appeals/ (last
visited Mar. 22, 2013).
44
§ 14-8-20.
45
How Judges Are Elected in South Carolina, S.C. JUD. DEP’T, http://www.judicial.state.sc.us
33
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Appeals is elected to six-year terms, which are also staggered.46 The court consists of a
Chief Judge and eight associate judges who hear cases in panels of three or en banc.47
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals covers questions of law and equity arising from the
circuit and family courts except those seven classes noted above which are the exclusive
jurisdiction of the South Carolina Supreme Court.48
The second largest branch of the judiciary in the state is the circuit court system.
The General Assembly elects forty-six circuit court judges from the sixteen judicial
circuits and thirteen circuit court judges from the state at-large for six-year terms.49 The
South Carolina circuit courts sit either as the Court of Common Pleas (civil cases) or as
the Court of General Sessions (criminal cases).50
In addition to the circuit courts there is also a system of family courts. Similar to
other judges discussed above, family court judges are elected by a joint public vote of the
General Assembly.51 At least two family court judges are elected for six-year terms to
each of the sixteen judicial circuits, with fifty-two judges who rotate primarily from
county to county within their resident circuits.52 Jurisdiction of the family court is
limited to domestic or family relations and cases involving juvenile-minors under the age
of seventeen.53
South Carolina’s court system is structured like many other states with the bulk of
cases being heard on the circuit court and family court levels. With an understanding of
the court system in place, it is important to understand how South Carolina came to its
current process of judicial selection.
a.

A Brief History of the Election of Judges in South Carolina

South Carolina has always been, and continues to be, a strong legislative state.54
Since 1776, the General Assembly has enjoyed unfettered control over the election of
justices and judges. The state’s prior constitutions of 1776, 1778, 1790, 1861, 1865, and
1868 are all consistent with respect to the General Assembly’s plenary control over the
election process.55 Under the 1895 constitution and until 1997, this legislative dominance
continued virtually unaltered.56 However, the passage of a 1997 constitutional
amendment57 led to the establishment of the Judicial Merit Selection Committee, an
independent body exclusively charged with determining which three judicial candidates’
/judges/howjudgeselected.cfm (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
46
S.C. CONST. art. V, § 8.
47
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-8-80; see also Court of Appeals, supra note 43.
48
§ 14-8-200.
49
See § 14-5-610; Circuit Court, S.C. JUD. DEP’T, http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/circuitCourt/ (last visited
Mar. 22, 2013).
50
See Circuit Court, supra note 49.
51
S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-19-80 (providing for the Judicial Merit Selection Commission to nominate
candidates to be elected by the General Assembly to the family court, among other courts).
52
See Family Court, S.C. JUD. DEP’T, http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/familyCourt/ (last visited Mar. 22,
2013); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 63-3-30, 63-3-40, 63-3-320.
53
S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-3-510.
54
See COLE BLEASE GRAHAM, JR., THE SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 46 (2007).
55
See infra Part I.A.1.b.
56
See infra Part I.A.1.b
57
South Carolina Constitution article V (“The Judicial Department”) was amended by House Bill 3063 to
add Section 27 (“Judicial Merit Selection Commission”). Act of June 4, 1997, 1997 S.C. Acts 76.
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names will be submitted to the General Assembly. The General Assembly, in turn, is now
constitutionally limited to choosing only among the three candidates submitted by the
commission.58 The merit selection system presently used in South Carolina differs
significantly from both a popular election system and a system based on executive
appointment, as well as from a true merit-based selection process.59
b.

South Carolina’s Past Constitutions

Between the years 1776 and 1895, South Carolina was governed by six constitutions:
The constitutions of 1776, 1778, 1790, 1861, 1865, and 1868.60 Provisions from the
antebellum constitutions of 1776,61 1778,62 and 179063 concerning the election of judicial
officers (other than justices of the peace)64 are virtually identical, and all three provide for
election by joint vote of both houses of the state legislature. However, the two Civil War
era constitutions of 1861 and 1865 differ with respect to the joint vote.65 Finally, the
Reconstruction era constitution of 1868 contains two provisions calling for election by a
joint legislative vote.66 Without exception, the power to elect judges rested exclusively
with the legislature from the years 1776 until 1895.
58

See infra Part I.A.1.c.
“Known as either the Missouri Plan or the A.B.A. Plan, the merit system was first formulated by
Professor Albert Kales for the American Judicature Society in 1914.” Martin Scott Driggers, Jr., South
Carolina’s Experiment: Legislative Control of Judicial Merit Selection, 49 S.C. L. REV. 1217, 1224-25
(1998) (citing Glenn R. Winters, The Merit Plan for Judicial Selection and Tenure—Its Historical
Development, in JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE: SELECTED READINGS 29, 30–31 (Glenn R. Winters ed.,
1973)).
60
See GRAHAM, supra note 54, at 10 (“South Carolina adopted its first state constitution March 26, 1776.
Since then, it has formally had six more (1778, 1790, 1861, 1865, 1868, and 1895).”). The 1861
constitution is included, although some scholars debate whether it should be counted as a separate
constitution to the extent that “the existing provisions for internal governance were not changed
significantly.” Id. at 16.
61
The 1776 constitution provides “[t]hat all other judicial officers shall be chosen by ballot, jointly by the
general assembly and legislative council, and except the judges of the court of chancery, commissioned by
the president and commander-in-chief, during good behavior, but shall be removed on address of the
general assembly and legislative council.” S.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XX, available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/sc01.asp.
62
The 1778 constitution provides “[t]hat all other judicial officers shall be chosen by ballot jointly by the
senate and house of representatives, and, except the judges of the court of chancery, commissioned by the
governor and commander-in-chief during good behavior, but shall be removed on address of the senate and
house of representatives.” S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXVII, available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/sc02.asp.
63
The 1790 constitution provides that “[t]he judges of the superior courts . . . shall be elected by the joint
ballot of both houses in the house of representatives.” S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. VI, § 1, reprinted in THE
CONSTITUTIONS OF SOUTH CAROLINA 18 (1976) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONS].
64
A justice of the peace, as used in the prior South Carolina constitutions, is similar to modern-day
magistrates in South Carolina. Cf. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 26 (“The Governor, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, shall appoint a number of magistrates for each county as provided by law.”).
65
Compare S.C. CONST. of 1861, art. VI, § 1, available at http://docsouth.unc.edu/imls/southcar/south.html
(“The Judges of the Superior Courts . . . shall be elected by the joint ballot of both Houses, in the House of
Representatives.”), with S.C. CONST. of 1865, art. III, § 1, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 63, at
44 (“The judges of the superior courts shall be elected by the general assembly . . . .”).
66
See S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, § 2, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 63, at 56 (“[The Chief
Justice and two Associate Justices] shall be elected by a joint vote of the General Assembly . . . .”); S.C.
59
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c.

The 1895 Constitution and the 1997 Reforms

White farmers of the up-country supported Tillman’s call for a constitutional
convention; the result was the 1895 Constitution.67 As expected, the 1895 constitution
continued the election of judicial candidates by a joint vote of the General Assembly.68
Election of justices of the Supreme Court and judges of the circuit courts were originally
provided for in article V, sections 3 and 13, respectively.69 In 1985, section 8 was added
to article V to address the election of judges of the new court of appeals.70 Prior to 1997,
an eight-member joint committee of the General Assembly functioned as a type of merit
commission.71 But the process of judicial selection suffered from some noteworthy
defects.72 The two most obvious defects included a dearth of objective criteria with
which legislators could evaluate a candidate, and the public perception that the General
Assembly simply elected those whom it knew best, i.e., former or sitting legislators.73
The calls for change were loud,74 and the subsequent reforms were real.75
The 1997 reforms were substantial because they banned sitting legislators from
running for a judicial office and vested nomination power exclusively in the new Judicial
Merit Selection Commission (JMSC). The JMSC is constituted as such:
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
Judicial Merit Selection Commission shall consist of the
following individuals:

CONST. of 1868, art. IV, § 11, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 63, at 56 (“All vacancies in the
Supreme Court or other inferior tribunals shall be filled by election as herein prescribed . . . .”).
67
GRAHAM, supra note 54, at 33-35.
68
See S.C. CONST. art. V, § 3 (“The members of the Supreme Court shall be elected by a joint public vote
of the General Assembly . . . .”).
69
S.C. CONST. art. V, § 3 (“Election of the members of the Supreme Court”); S.C. CONST. art V, § 13
(“Judicial circuits”).
70
S.C. CONST. art. V, § 8 (“Election of members of Court of Appeals”).
71
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-19-10 to -60.
72
See, e.g., Driggers, supra note 59, at 1227 (noting legislators “were able to elect any constitutionally
qualified candidate without regard to the General Assembly’s own standards for competency”); see also
Kevin Eberle, Judicial Selection in South Carolina: Who Gets to Judge?, S.C. LAW., May-June 2002, at 20,
22 (“[T]he public became increasingly vocal about the perception that judges were being selected based on
the good-old-boy system.”).
73
See Driggers, supra note 59, at 1227 (“The public perceived that the General Assembly too often elected
those [whom] it knew best—sitting or former legislators.”); see also Cindi Ross Scoppe, High-Level
Reformers Want to Change Way S.C. Selects Judges, THE STATE, Feb. 16, 1994, at B5 (noting that, in 1994,
all Supreme Court justices and over one-half of circuit court judges had at one point served in the General
Assembly).
74
See Driggers, supra note 59, at 1228 (“Both citizens and legislators were quick to denounce the
perceived inbreeding of South Carolina’s judicial selection system.”) (citing Chad Jenkins, Letter to the
Editor, Judicial Selection: State’s System Clearly Falls Short, THE STATE, Mar. 4, 1996, at A8; James
“Bubba” Cromer, Editorial, Fairness, Merit Must Be Part of Judicial Selection Process, THE STATE, Apr.
21, 1995, at A17); Cindi Ross Scoppe, Legislature Overhauls Judiciary, Third Pillar of Reforms Set, THE
STATE, May 30, 1996, at A1 (“A tradition of cronyism, based on political connections rather than
competence, was firmly entrenched in state law and custom.”).
75
See Driggers, supra note 59, at 1230 (“The new Act changes how South Carolina elects its judges in two
significant ways . . . .”).
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(1) Five members appointed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and of these appointments:
(a) Three members must be serving members of the
General Assembly; and
(b) Two members must be selected from the public,
(2) three members appointed by the Chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee and two members appointed by the
President Pro Tempore of the Senate and of these
appointments:
(a) Three members must be serving members of the
General Assembly; and
(b) Two members must be selected from the public.76
d.

The JMSC: Functions and Membership
1.

Functions

Title 2, Chapter 19 of the South Carolina code details the JMSC’s powers and
duties.77 The most significant of these include: (1) publicizing judicial vacancies;78 (2)
soliciting the Bar’s assessment of candidates;79 (3) holding public hearings regarding a
candidate’s qualifications;80 (4) evaluating candidates based upon a non-exhaustive list of
nine categories;81 (5) considering a candidate’s race, gender, national origin, and other
demographic factors;82 (6) administering oaths, taking depositions, and issuing
subpoenas;83 (7) ensuring candidates are neither sitting legislators nor former legislators,
who have been out of the General Assembly for less than one year;84 (8) submitting no
more than three candidates’ names for one seat and no fewer than three unless the
Commission explains itself to the General Assembly in writing;85 (9) screening retired
justices and judges on whom the Chief Justice might call to sit to hear certain cases;86
and, (10) selecting members to serve on various Citizens Committees, whose task
includes advising the Commission about a particular candidate, pursuant to rules
established by the Commission.87
In evaluating a candidate’s qualifications, the JMSC considers the following, nonexhaustive list of nine categories: (1) constitutional qualifications; (2) ethical fitness; (3)
professional and academic ability; (4) character; (5) reputation; (6) physical health; (7)
mental stability; (8) experience; and, (9) judicial temperament.88
76

S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-19-10(B) (2012).
§ 2-19-10.
78
§ 2-19-20.
79
§ 2-19-25.
80
§ 2-19-30.
81
§ 2-19-35.
82
§ 2-19-35.
83
§ 2-19-60.
84
§ 2-19-70.
85
§ 2-19-80.
86
§ 2-19-100.
87
§ 2-19-120.
88
These nine categories are listed in § 2-19-35(A).
77
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2.

Membership

Although close to a “true” merit-based selection system, the JMSC fails in one
important regard: sitting legislators dominate its membership.89 According to the
American Judicature Society, a true merit system includes the following three necessary
elements: “1) a commission comprised of both lay and lawyer members to recruit, screen,
investigate and evaluate judicial candidates; 2) nomination to the appointing authority of
a limited number of candidates; and 3) appointment by the governor or other appointing
authority.”90 “The logic behind merit selection is as follows: Most judicial selection
systems involve politics; politics is bad; ergo, judicial selection systems without politics
will yield ‘good’ judges.”91 However, politics and judicial elections are inseparable, for
“[t]he process of picking a person to be a judge is woven into the political fabric and is,
by any definition, a political process.”92 The key consideration then becomes how much
politics is too much.
B.
1.

Virginia
Overview

According to recent census data, Virginia has approximately eight million people,
of whom 68.6% are Caucasian, 19.4% are African American, 5.5% are Asian,
approximately 3.2% are other and almost 3% are “two or more races”.93 The population
is 7.9% Hispanic ethnicity, which is independent of racial classification.94 The
Commonwealth is 50.9% female and 49.1% male.95 Virginia’s judicial system is
comprised of three levels of courts: appellate, trial, and limited jurisdiction courts.96
These levels consist of five jurisdictionally distinct courts: the supreme court, the court of
89

The ideal commission consists of seven members: three lawyers chosen by the state bar association, three
members of the general public chosen by the governor of the state, and one sitting judge who serves as the
chairman. See Driggers supra note 59, at 1225.
90
AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: CURRENT STATUS, Introduction (1993).
As of March 2013, the following ten individuals constitute the JMSC’s membership: (1) Sen. Larry A.
Martin; (2) Sen. Floyd Nicholson; (3) Sen. George E. “Chip” Campsen, III; (4) Joseph Preston “Pete”
Strom Jr.; (5) Kristian M. Cross; (6) Rep. Alan D. Clemmons; (7) Rep. David J. Mack, III; (8) Rep. Bruce
W. Bannister; (9) John Davis Harrell, Esq.; and (10) H. Donald Sellers, Esq. See Judicial Merit Selection
Commission Members, S.C. LEGISLATURE,
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/judicialmeritpage/JMSCMembersMarch2013.pdf (last visited June 6, 2013).
The membership of the JMSC has mostly remained the same since Segars-Andrews v. JMSC was decided.
What has not changed is legislators comprising the majority of the JMSC. The presence of legislators on
the JMSC necessarily makes the JMSC a political body, an effect that wholly defeats the rationale behind a
merit-based selection system. Segars-Andrews v. JMSC is a case involving a sitting family court judge
who was deemed “unfit” to be re-appointed to her seat. The case is discussed at length infra Part III.A.
91
Driggers supra note 59, at 1224.
92
Daniel J. Meador, Some Yins and Yangs of Our Judicial System, 66 A.B.A. J. 122, 122 (1980).
93
See 2010 Census Interactive Population Search – VA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/2010census/popmap/ipmtext.php?fl=51 (last visited June 6, 2013).
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
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appeals, the circuit courts, the general district courts, and the juvenile and domestic
relations district courts.97
The Supreme Court of Virginia possesses both original and appellate jurisdiction,
with its primary function being review of decisions of the lower courts, including
decisions of the court of appeals.98 The court consists of seven justices who serve for
terms of twelve years.99 The Court of Appeals of Virginia provides appellate review of
final decisions of the circuit courts in domestic relations matters, appeals from decisions
of an administrative agency, traffic infractions, and criminal cases.100 The eleven judges
of the court of appeals serve for terms of eight years and sit in panels of at least three
judges, and membership on the panel is rotated.101 The only trial court of general
jurisdiction in Virginia is the circuit courts.102 The judges of the circuit courts also serve
for terms of eight years.103 Virginia’s unified district court system consists of the general
district court and the juvenile and domestic relations district courts.104 Judges of the
general district courts and judges of the juvenile and domestic relations courts serve for
terms of six years.105
a.

A Brief History of the Election of Judges in Virginia

In Virginia, judges are selected for the bench by a process of legislative election.
Like South Carolina, Virginia also has had several constitutions, including the original
constitution adopted in 1776. There were six subsequent major revisions in 1830, 1851,
1864, 1869, 1902, and, most recently, 1971.106 Interestingly, not all of these constitutions
are consistent with respect to the General Assembly’s plenary control over the election
process of judges.107 Under the 1851 constitution, and until 1870, the state reverted to
election of judges by popular vote.108 However, the passage of the 1870 constitution
reestablished selection of the judiciary by the General Assembly in the state, reverting
judicial selection to a process of exclusive legislative control.109
An important contrast to South Carolina’s constitutional history is that Virginia has
never adopted a provision similar to the 1997 South Carolina constitutional amendment
establishing an “independent” body exclusively charged with determining which judicial
candidates are qualified for submission to the General Assembly. This constitutional
change led to the creation of the Judicial Merit Selection Commission in South
97

Id. (establishing the foundation for the judiciary as set forth by General Assembly); VA. CODE ANN. §
17.1-300 (2012) (supreme court); §17.1-400 (court of appeals); § 17.1-500 (circuit courts); § 16.1-69.5
(general district, juvenile, and domestic relations courts).
98
VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
99
VA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 7.
100
See VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-405; § 17.1-406.
101
§§ 17.1-400(A), -402(B).
102
§ 17.1-513.
103
VA. CONST., art. VI, § 7.
104
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-69.7.
105
§ 16.1-69.9.
106
THE HORNBOOK OF VIRGINIA HISTORY: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE OLD DOMINION’S PEOPLE, PLACES,
AND PAST 95-98 (Emily J. Salmon & Edward D.C. Campbell, Jr. eds., 4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter VIRGINIA
HISTORY].
107
See infra Part I.B.1.b.
108
See infra Part I.B.1.b.
109
VA. CONST., art. VI, § 7.
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Carolina.110 Virginia’s lack of a qualifying commission is an interesting and significant
difference between the only two states that employ a selection process exclusively
controlled by the legislature. It would seem that in order to qualify truly as a “merit”
system, the process of judicial selection would need to incorporate some element of
actual qualifications. Thus, the lack of any qualifying commission, much less a
diversified one, places Virginia's selection process in a unique category. Virginia's
system is one with complete legislative control with little or no outside influence or
considerations.
b.

Virginia’s Past Constitutions

Virginia’s constitutional changes reflect various power struggles occurring in the
Commonwealth—and in the country—over its long history. The 1776 Virginia
Constitution, adopted shortly after the Declaration of Independence, limited the right to
vote in the state to the wealthy and to landowners, effectively concentrating power in the
hands of a few.111 As discontent grew between farmers in the western part of the state,
who owned and cultivated their own land, and wealthy slave-owners in the east, a
constitutional convention was called in 1829. One of the key issues at the convention
was concern about representation in the legislature and who had the right to vote.112
Ultimately, members of the convention reached a resolution and adopted a new
constitution, giving the western counties only a slightly larger proportion of legislative
seats.113 Discontent between the westerners and wealthy easterners continued.114
As tensions in the country grew over the issue of slavery, mistrust and hostility
persisted between the two divisions of populations in Virginia.115 The legislature called
another constitutional convention in 1851 in the wake of the 1840 census.116 The
alterations made to the 1851 constitution changed the Virginia political system to a
system of popular election. This included popular election for the governor, the newly
created office of lieutenant governor, and all Virginia judges.117 It was a dramatic
alteration from the prior system, in which the top two state officers were elected by the
legislature and the judges were appointed.118 This marked a significant, albeit brief,
change in judicial selection in Virginia.
The Virginia legislature adopted, without a popular vote, the 1864 constitution
after the legislature voted for secession from the Union.119 The legitimacy of this

110

See supra Part I.A.
See VIRGINIA HISTORY, supra note 106, at 97; VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights §6, available at
http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/va-1776.htm (“and that all men, having sufficient evidence of permanent
common interest with, and attachment to, the community, have the right of suffrage”).
112
See VIRGINIA HISTORY, supra note 106, at 41.
113
See id.
114
See id. (discussing westerners’ calls for more representation).
115
See id.
116
See generally id. at 41-42.
117
See VA. CONST. of 1851, art. VI, available at http://vagovernmentmatters.org/archive/files
/vaconstitution1851_ded45111de.pdf.
118
See VA. CONST. of 1851.
119
See VIRGINIA HISTORY, supra note 106, at 46.
111
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constitution has been questioned in light of its creation and adoption during wartime and
without ratification by voters.120
The 1870 constitution marked a stark contrast to the 1864 constitution. The
changes adopted after the Civil War included the right to vote by all men over the age of
21, including freedmen.121 Importantly, the 1870 constitution incorporated the provisions
of the 1864 constitution, which had returned the process of judicial selection to the
General Assembly.122 Unlike the 1864 constitution, the 1870 constitution was ratified by
a popular vote.123 Following 1864 and the post-Civil War/Reconstruction era of the 1870
constitution, the 1902 constitution reflected the ideas of racial segregation and the
adoption of Jim Crow laws throughout the South, including Virginia.124 These changes
were an attempt to marginalize or eliminate the Black vote, which came about earlier in
the post-Civil War era.125
Ultimately, the latest revision to the Virginia constitution in 1971 replaced the
1902 constitution. This constitution broadly reflected the principles of the civil rights
movement in the United States.126 The 1971 constitution included the right to vote for all
men and women, regardless of color, and reaffirmed the judicial selection system that had
been in place since the constitution of 1864, (i.e., through legislative appointment).127
The 1971 constitution is the most current constitution in Virginia, and more importantly,
it reflects the current state of judicial selection in the Commonwealth.
c.

Current System

Under the current system of judicial selection, once a vacancy occurs or a new
seat is created by the General Assembly, the Virginia Supreme Court advises the General
Assembly with regard to the circuit courts and appellate courts as to whether or not a
vacancy should be filled.128 Additionally, the Committee on District Courts also advises
the General Assembly regarding vacancies on the district level.129 This certification
process to fill the vacancies is primarily based on caseload statistics.130 However, while
this certification process is not binding on the legislature, it is required for district court
vacancies prior to filling.131
“Once the vacancy is ‘certified’ by the appropriate body, the House and Senate
Committees for Courts of Justice begin taking nominations from General Assembly
members.”132 However, the Senate’s rules require all senators—both Republican and
120

See VA. CONST. Foreward, n. 1, available at http://legis.state.va.us/Laws/search/ConstOfVa.pdf; Leroy
Rountree Hassell, Sr., The Evolution of Virginia’s Constitutions: A Celebration of the Rule of Law in
America, 20 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2007).
121
See VA. CONST. of 1870, art. II, § 1.
122
See VA. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, §§ 5, 11, 13.
123
See VIRGINIA HISTORY, supra note 106, at 98.
124
See id. at 63-64.
125
See id.
126
See id. at 98.
127
See generally VA. CONST. of 1971.
128
See VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-511.
129
See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-69.9:3.
130
See Judicial Selection Overview, COMMW. OF VA. DIV. OF LEGIS. SERVS.,
http://dls.virginia.gov/judicial.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
131
See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-69.9:3.
132
Judicial Selection Overview, supra note 130.
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Democrat—representing each circuit to unanimously nominate a candidate for each
vacancy or new seat.133 Typically, that person is supported on the floor by the rest of the
senators.134 In the event that the circuit senators do not nominate anyone, any senator
may make a nomination on the floor.135 The Committees then determine whether each
individual is qualified for the judgeship sought.136 Following the Courts Committee’s
determination of qualification, a report listing qualified candidates is made to each house
of the General Assembly.137 The House and Senate vote separately, and the candidate
receiving a plurality of votes in each house is elected to the vacant judgeship or new
seat.138 Incumbent judges standing for election to a subsequent term must go through the
same process.139 The election does not require action by the Governor.140
II.

COMPARISONS BETWEEN SOUTH CAROLINA AND VIRGINIA

One cannot fully appreciate the issue of diversity on the court without a
conversation involving statistics. Statistics is the study of the collection, organization,
analysis, and interpretation of data. Statistics also provides tools for prediction and
forecasting using this data. However, statistics and the data can be manipulated.
Therefore, a thorough explanation and understanding of what is being measured and how
it is measured is necessary so as not to draw improper conclusions from the collection of
data.
In South Carolina, it appears that the appellate courts are extremely diverse in
their current makeup. The South Carolina Supreme Court has a current composition of
two female justices and one African American justice out of a total of five justices
overall.141 As a result, South Carolina’s Supreme Court is 40% female and 20% African
American. Additionally, it appears that the Court of Appeals is diverse as well, with two

133

See A Legislator’s Guide to the Judicial Selection Process, VA. DIV. OF LEGIS. SERVS.,
http://dls.virginia.gov/pubs/legisguidejudicselect.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Judicial Selection Overview, supra note 130. This process has been described further in a recent bill
amending §17.1-100.1 of the Virginia code. H.B. 745, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012) (“The
Supreme Court shall develop and implement a weighted caseload system to precisely measure and compare
judicial caseloads throughout the Commonwealth on the circuit court, general district court, and juvenile
and domestic relations district court levels. The system shall include the development of a comprehensive
workload model, an objective means of determining the need for judicial positions, an assessment of the
optimum distribution of judicial positions throughout the Commonwealth, and a recommended plan for the
realignment of the circuit and district boundaries. The Supreme Court shall report to the General Assembly
by November 15, 2013, on the weighted caseload in each court in each county and city, and in each circuit
and district based on the current circuit and district boundaries. The report shall include the current number
of judges assigned to each court in each county and city. The Court shall also recommend a plan for the
realignment of the circuit and district boundaries and the number of judges the Court recommends for
assignment to each court in each county and city within the new circuits and districts.”)
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Judges by Gender and Race, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF S.C., http://lwvsc.org/files/race
_and_gender_chart_1_.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
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female judges and one African American judge out of nine total judges.142 Thus, the
South Carolina Court of Appeals is 22% female and 11% African American.
As stated earlier, a broader look at all courts in the state suggests the circuit or
lower level courts do not statistically reflect the demographics of the state. On the circuit
court level, which has jurisdiction over all criminal and civil cases and where the
majority of litigants appear, South Carolina has only four African American judges and
five female judges out of a total of forty-six judges.143 By way of illustration, in 2010, the
circuit courts in South Carolina handled approximately 232,000 cases.144 The appellate
courts—the court of appeals and the supreme court combined—handled approximately
3100 cases, or 1.3% percent of the number handled at the trial level.145 Thus, while it
may appear that South Carolina is achieving some measure of diversity based on the
statistical makeup of the appellate courts in the state, the appearance of diversity is more
pronounced on the appellate level than on the circuit level, which is where most litigants
appear. The statistics for Virginia’s courts are similar. In 2009, the Virginia trial level
courts handled approximately 4.1 million cases,146 while the appellate courts combined
resolved approximately 5200 cases or .13% of the trial court cases.147 Nonetheless, it is
instructive to compare statistically how South Carolina and Virginia compare to the other
forty-eight states and the District of Columbia based on diversity, as well as against each
other.
According to the American Bar Association’s database on diversity in state
courts, as of 2010, the racial diversity of the judiciary in South Carolina was 9%.148 In
Virginia, the racial diversity of its judiciary was 11%.149 By way of comparison,
Georgia, which employs a system of non-partisan popular election of judges, had a
composition of 11% of a racially diverse judiciary.150 California, which employs a
system of election by the General Assembly with confirmation from a committee of
individuals who are not legislators, has a diversity composition of 23%.151 Ohio utilizes a
system of partisan primary selection followed by a nonpartisan general election.152 Ohio
has a diversity composition of 4%.153 In New Mexico, where judges are selected by
partisan election,154 the diversity composition of the judiciary is 30%.155 However, in
142

Id.
Id. Judges Jefferson and Lee are counted in both statistics as female and African-American. Id.
144
State Court Caseload Statistics, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, http://www.courtstatistics.org/OtherPages/StateCourtCaseloadStatistics.aspx (follow “Civil and Criminal– National Caseloads” hyperlink)
[hereinafter Trial Caseloads] (last visited June 6, 2012).
145
State Court Caseload Statistics, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, http://www.courtstatistics.org/OtherPages/StateCourtCaseloadStatistics.aspx (follow “Appellate – Grand Total Court Caseloads” hyperlink)
[hereinafter Appellate Caseloads] (last visited June 6, 2012).
146
Trial Caseloads, supra note 144.
147
Appellate Caseloads, supra note 145.
148
National Database on Judicial Diversity in State Courts, A.B.A., http://apps.americanbar.org/abanet/jd
/display/national.cfm#3 (last visited Mar. 23 ,2013).
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
See Judicial Selection in the States: Ohio, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=OH (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
153
National Database, supra note 148.
154
See Judicial Selection in the States: New Mexico, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=NM (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
143
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Illinois, which also uses partisan elections to select judges,156 the diversity composition is
14%.157
Assuming again that diversity on the bench is a worthy objective, the conclusion
to be drawn is that there is no system that outpaces the others in achieving greater
diversity on the bench. Factors such as diversity of the state population play an important
role. For example, in Hawaii, which utilizes a system of General Assembly election from
a nominating committee with senate confirmation,158 but with a high percentage of
minorities in the state, the judiciary has a diversity composition of 67%.159 Clearly, this
is not to say that the judicial selection process in Hawaii is better suited to create a more
diverse judiciary. So where does the answer to the question of how best to achieve
diversity on the bench lie?
We now return to South Carolina and Virginia. Given the statistical data above,
with 9% and 11% diversity compositions of the judiciary respectively, this ranks South
Carolina twenty-first and Virginia fourteenth out of the fifty states and the District of
Columbia.160 In contrast, Missouri is thirty-second out of fifty.161 Other states that
utilize the Missouri Plan and their ranks are as follows: Alaska ranks fortieth;162 Arizona,
tied with South Carolina, ranks twenty-first;163 Florida ranks twelfth;164 and Iowa, which
includes a requirement of gender diversity on its commission, ranks thirty-sixth.165 As
shown, South Carolina and Virginia, while utilizing a system of judicial selection that is
controlled exclusively by one branch of government without input or inclusion of other
branches, appear to perform well against other systems in achieving the goal of diversity
on the bench, including when compared to the lauded Missouri Plan.
There are important differences in the processes in South Carolina and Virginia
however. South Carolina’s use of the JMSC, which has a statutory requirement of being
comprised of a majority of sitting legislators, but includes four non-legislators, has led to
criticism of South Carolina’s system for lacking checks and balances. Conversely, the
use of the JMSC has led to credit for the state’s adoption of a qualifying commission,
which furthers the idea of a merit system.166 The inclusion of a checks and balances
approach is clearly present in the Missouri Plan, which utilizes a non-partisan
commission in addition to legislative, gubernatorial, and voter input in the process. An
additional criticism of the South Carolina system is the statutory requirement that
legislators comprise a majority of the JSMC, which results in sitting legislators in South

155

National Database, supra note 148.
See Judicial Selection in the States: Illinois, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=IL (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
157
National Database, supra note 148.
158
See Judicial Selection in the States: Hawaii, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=HI (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
159
National Database, supra note 148.
160
See infra Appendix A.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
See Larry O'Dell, Critics Target Virginia Judge Selection Process, PILOTONLINE.COM (March 20, 2009),
http://hamptonroads.com/2009/03/critics-target-virginias-judge-selection-process.
156
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Carolina acting as both the “qualifiers” and the “selectors” of the judges.167 In contrast,
Virginia’s selection process is criticized for not using any qualifying commission, but
instead using a system in which a legislative committee acts as the qualifiers with no
outside interests represented.168 This criticism also goes to the issue of a lack of a checks
and balances system in Virginia by vesting complete, unfettered control in the
legislature.169
Another important concern is that of judicial independence.
How is
independence to be measured? A recent court decision in South Carolina sheds light on
the issue of judicial selection and independence of judges and, more particularly, on the
issue of politics in the judicial selection process in a state that employs an exclusive
legislature-controlled system. Politics and judicial elections are inseparable, for, as
Professor Daniel Meador observes, “the process of picking a person to be a judge is
woven into the political fabric and is, by any definition, a political process.”170 The key
consideration then becomes how much politics is too much.
III.

SEGARS-ANDREWS V. JMSC: WHAT IT TEACHES
A.

Factual Background

On July 30, 2004, Mr. Simpson brought a divorce action in Clarendon County
Family Court between Mr. Simpson and his wife.171 There was no true adversary
proceeding, as Mrs. Simpson “had been induced to sign a [pro se answer] at the time the
complaint was filed.”172 The answer she filed was drafted by her husband’s lawyer.173
“Under the Agreement, Mrs. Simpson gave up claims to substantial marital assets . . . but
[the Agreement] was later challenged by Mrs. Simpson for various reasons, including
issues pertaining to her competence to enter into the Agreement in light of her ‘medical
disorders and medications’. . . .”174 Family Court Judge McFadden agreed with Mrs.
Simpson and held the agreement to be invalid.175
167

Brief of League of Women Voters of S.C. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5, Segars-Andrews
v. JMSC, 691 S.E.2d 453 (S.C. 2010), [hereinafter League Brief] available at
http://www.justiceatstake.org/file.cfm/media/news/Amicus_Brief_South_Carolina_32CD4C5A3D6EE.pdf.
168
O’Dell, supra note 166.
169
Id.
170
Meador, supra note 92, at 122.
171
See JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION COMM., REPORT OF A CANDIDATES QUALIFICATIONS: THE HONORABLE
F.P. “CHARLIE” SEGARS-ANDREWS, FAMILY COURT, NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, SEAT 1 24 (2008)
[hereinafter JMSC REPORT], available at
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/judicialmeritpage/FinalSegarsAndrewsCharlie.pdf.
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 25. Professor John P. Freeman elaborates on why he went into so much detail about the agreement
in the Judicial Merit Selection Commission report on the Segars-Andrews case: “I call attention to the
background concerning the Agreement between the parties in Simpson II because, in my opinion, had the
Agreement not been executed and later challenged and then thrown out by Judge McFadden, Mr.
Simpson[’s] attack on Judge Segars-Andrews qualifications matter would not have arisen. I say this
because, in my opinion, absent that Agreement, the split between husband and wife in Simpson II would
have been 60:40 in the husband’s favor, with each side paying their own fees. Had this occurred, I doubt
Mr. Simpson[] would have raised any complaint about the judge’s fairness.” Id.
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“By the time Judge Segars-Andrews came on the scene, the Agreement, created
on behalf of Mr. Simpson to eliminate his wife’s rights to substantial marital assets, had
already been set aside.”176 Segars-Andrews ruled only on custody, child support,
visitation, equitable division, and attorney’s fees and costs.177 On April 12, 2006, Mr.
Simpson filed a motion to disqualify Segars-Andrews from presiding over the divorce
action.178 His complaint was based upon Segars-Andrews’ husband’s law partner having
rendered an affidavit in support of the fee petition submitted by the attorneys who
represented Mr. Simpson’s mother in her divorce approximately fourteen months prior to
Mr. Simpson’s divorce action.179 On April 14, 2006, Segars-Andrews initially denied Mr.
Simpson’s motion, but she then, sua sponte, decided to recuse herself when she
discovered that Mr. Simpson’s wife’s attorney and Segars-Andrews’ husband’s law firm
had previously worked together on a legal matter worth approximately $300,000.180
On April 26, 2006, Mr. Simpson’s wife’s attorney filed a memorandum of law
with an affidavit attached from Professor Nathan Crystal.181 Professor Crystal offered his
professional opinion regarding Segars-Andrews’ recusal, and he concluded that she did
not have to recuse herself and, in fact, had a duty to rule in the case.182 On May 3, 2006,
Segars-Andrews agreed that she had a duty to rule in the case and that there was no duty
to disclose the working relationship in which her husband was involved.183 Both the
South Carolina Court of Appeals,184 and the South Carolina Commission on Judicial
Conduct185 agreed with Segars-Andrews’ decision. Unsatisfied, Mr. Simpson pursued his
grievance and filed a complaint with the JMSC.186 Mr. Simpson had this to say:
And once we called it [the deal between Segars-Andrews’ husband and his
law partner, Mr. Shull] out on the table in front of her [Segars-Andrews],
she recused herself. And then now it’s another cover up of all the good
old-boy-system, I feel like, and it’s cost me a lot of money and a lot of
things had taken place and this is not right. It don’t smell good. It don’t
look good.187
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See Simpson v. Simpson, 660 S.E.2d 274 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008) (finding Segars-Andrews had not abused
her discretion in making the division of marital property and an award of almost $80,000 in costs and
attorneys fees to Mr. Simpson’s wife).
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See Segars-Andrews v. JMSC, 691 S.E.2d 453, 456 n.1 (S.C. 2010) (per curiam) (“The Commission on
Judicial Conduct dismissed the complaint, finding there was no evidence Petitioner [Segars-Andrews] had
violated any ethical rules.”); JMSC REPORT, supra note 171, at 11 (“Mr. Simpson then brought a complaint
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The judicial reforms of the late 1990s were directed in large part at remedying the
perception that judicial elections were dominated by the “good-old-boy” system, and that
this is to what Mr. Simpson alluded.188 What is far from patent is how Segars-Andrews
could ever have been seriously decried as being representative of this system. Unlike a
vast majority of her colleagues who, in 1993, came from the General Assembly, SegarsAndrews was elected after having been in private practice in Charleston, S.C., since
1984.189 In 2008, Segars-Andrews’ service to the Charleston County Juvenile Drug
Court earned her the recognition of the South Carolina House of Representatives.190
Unfortunately, a majority of the JMSC gave short shrift to the overwhelming evidence of
Segars-Andrews’ fitness to remain on the family court bench.191
By a 7–3 vote,192 the JMSC found Segars-Andrews unqualified because “SegarAndrews’ conduct caused an appearance of impropriety that led a litigant not only to
question [her] ability to render a fair and impartial decision, but also to lose faith in the
integrity of this state’s judicial system.”193 Senator Glen McConnell,194 the author of the
majority’s opinion and chairman of the JMSC at the time,195 wrote that Segars-Andrews’
conduct “create[ed] within a reasonable mind the perception that her ability to carry out
judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality, and competence was impaired.”196
Interpreting197 and applying Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Sen. McConnell
and the majority found that Segars-Andrews did not avoid the appearance of
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See supra text accompanying note 72–75.
See Judge Frances P. Segars-Andrews, JUDGEPEDIA,
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impropriety.198 Finding Segars-Andrews unqualified to continue serving as a family
court judge, the JMSC ended the career of a 16-year veteran jurist.199
On January 22, 2010, the Supreme Court of South Carolina granted200 SegarsAndrews’ petition to hear her case in the court’s original jurisdiction.201 Segars-Andrews
challenged the constitutionality of the JMSC on three grounds: (1) the presence of
legislators on the JMSC violates the state’s ban against dual office holding;202 (2) the
presence of legislators on the JSMC contravenes the manifest intent of the 1997
amendment, which Segars-Andrews argued was to create a body wholly apart from the
General Assembly;203 and (3) the JMSC threatens judicial independence, which is
necessary to the proper and legitimate functioning of the judiciary.204 Oral argument was
heard on March 2, 2010, and the court issued an opinion on March 23, 2010,205
expressing that the court felt “constrained”206 to dismiss Segars-Andrews’ complaint.
The first problem with the court’s holding is its cursory review of the dual office
holding, or ex officio, argument that Segars-Andrews raised in her petition.
B.

Dual Office Holding

Segars-Andrews argued that sitting legislators are constitutionally ineligible for
membership on the JMSC.207 To prevail on this claim, Segars-Andrews had to prove that
service on the JMSC is a constitutional office and, consequently, legislators who sat on
the JMSC violated the dual office holding prohibition of the South Carolina Constitution,
as set forth in article III, section 24.208 As to whether service on the JMSC is a
constitutional office, the court found in Segars-Andrews’ favor, holding that “[t]he
exercise of power of the sovereign by the JMSC is seen not only in its ability to favorably
submit judicial candidates to the Legislature for consideration, but more importantly in its
198

Id. at 16.
Martha Neil, 16-Year Judge Loses Seat on Bench Over Husband’s Peripheral Role in 1 Divorce Case,
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in_1_divorc/ (Mar. 24, 2010).
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See id. at 458–61 (addressing the separation of powers argument); see also League Brief, supra note
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See id. at 463–64 (addressing judicial independence concerns raised by Segars-Andrews and various
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power to exclude candidates.”209 The court reasoned that since the Legislature lacks the
authority to consider a judicial candidate whose name is not submitted by the JMSC,210
there could be “no serious contention that the JMSC is not a constitutional office . . . .”211
Instead of ending its analysis there and holding that legislative membership on the JMSC
violated the dual office holding ban, the court continued by stating that “[a] finding of an
‘office,’ for constitutional purposes does not end the inquiry.”212 The court claimed that
its jurisprudence contains “a narrow, yet firmly established, exception”213 known as the
“ex officio” or “incidental duties” exception.214 Citing no case to support its rule
statement, the court characterized the ex officio exception as one that “may be properly
invoked only where there is a constitutional nexus in terms of power and responsibilities
between the first office and the ‘ex officio’ office.”215 To support its conclusion, the
court cited to and relied upon two of its precedents: Ashmore v. Greater Greenville Sewer
District216 and Spartanburg County v. Miller.217 There is, however, a glaring gap in the
Court’s analysis: the ex officio exception is far from “firmly established.” The following
analysis of these two cases, along with analysis of the cases to which each cites, will
provide the necessary background for understanding the significance of the SegarsAndrews court’s application of the ex officio exception.
Neither Ashmore nor Miller applied the ex officio exception. In Ashmore, the
court held that “a member cannot sit upon the board of auditorium trustees. . . and at the
same time retain his membership in the General Assembly.”218 Although the court
invalidated the statute as violative of the dual office holding prohibition, the court stated
in dicta that “[t]he rule here enforced with respect to double or dual officeholding in
violation of the constitution is not applicable to those officers upon whom other duties
relating to their respective offices are placed by law.”219 The court explained the
exception by offering the example of “ex officio membership upon a board or
commission of the unit of government which the officer serves in his official capacity,
and the functions of the board or commission are related to the duties of the office.”220
Next, the court offered a more specific example of when the ex officio exception would
apply: “In mind as an example is an airport operated by two or more units of government.
A governing board of it might be properly created by appointment ex officio of officers
of the separate governmental units whose duties of their respective offices have
reasonable relation to their functions ex officio.”221 Finally, in support of its analysis, the
court cites two cases: State ex rel. Ray v. Blease222 and McCullers v. Board of Wake
209
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County.223 Neither of these cases is persuasive. In Blease, the court never reached the
question of whether the ex officio exception applies because the court concluded as a
threshold matter that the office in question was not a constitutional office and, therefore,
the dual office holding prohibition did not apply.224 McCullers is a North Carolina case
that interpreted the dual office holding prohibition enshrined in the North Carolina
constitution, but its analysis does not shed any light on South Carolina’s dual office
holding jurisprudence.225 Thus, the Ashmore case provides us with a vaguely defined,
never-before-applied ex officio exception, with only two unhelpful cases cited as support.
Equally as unenlightening as Ashmore is Miller. As an initial matter, it should be
noted that the Miller court was not even presented with a constitutional challenge based
on the constitution’s dual office holding provision.226 The Miller court clearly stated that
it was addressing whether the act in question violated the separation of powers clause of
the constitution.227
Additionally, the only case to which Miller cites for support of its
analysis is Stockman v. Leddy,228 a Colorado case that does not address dual office
holding.229 Thus, Miller is wholly unhelpful for purposes of a constitutional analysis
under the dual office holding provision of the constitution since the case deals
exclusively with separation of powers concerns.
Neither of the cases to which the Segars-Andrews court cites provides a sufficient
precedential basis for applying the ex officio exception. Interestingly enough, the one
case that does provide support for application of the exception was cited nowhere in the
Segars-Andrews opinion. Five years after Ashmore, the supreme court decided Welling v.
Clinton Newberry Natural Gas Authority.230 In Welling, the petitioner challenged the
constitutionality of an act that created the Clinton Newberry Natural Gas Authority.231
The act provided that the Authority would “consist of seven members, six of whom shall
be members ex officio,”232 and the ex officio members consisted of the mayors of Clinton
and Newberry, along with two members of each municipality’s city council chosen by
their respective city councils.233 The petitioner challenged the act as violative of article
2, section 2 of the South Carolina Constitution.234 Without providing any substantive
analysis, the court held that “[i]t was distinctly recognized in [Ashmore] that ex officio
membership of the character here involved did not contravene this constitutional
provision.”235 If the Segars-Andrews court had to rely on any precedent, it surely should
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Blease, 79 S.E. at 251 (“The answer to this objection is that membership in the [Sinking Fund
Commission] is not an office.”).
225
McCullers, 73 S.E. at 818 (“Article 14, § 7, of state Constitution, forbids the holding of two offices by
one man at the same time.”) (internal quotations omitted).
226
See Spartanburg Cnty. v. Miller, 132 S.E. 673, 676 (S.C. 1924) (“The third proposition advanced is that
the act contravenes section 14, article 1, of the Constitution . . . .”).
227
Id.
228
129 P. 220 (Colo. 1912).
229
Id.
230
71 S.E.2d 7 (S.C. 1952).
231
Id. at 8.
232
Id at 9.
233
Id.
234
Id. at 10.
235
Id.
224

196

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2013

have cited Welling, especially since Welling is the court’s first application of the ex
officio exception. The second application, of course, is in Segars-Andrews itself.
When the dust finally settles, we are left with only two examples of when it is
appropriate to apply the “ex officio” exception. The first example is “an airport operated
by two or more units of government,” where the governing board “might be properly
created by appointment ex officio of officers of the separate governmental units whose
duties of their respective offices have reasonable relation to their functions ex officio.”236
The second example is the natural gas Authority that was the focus of the Welling case.237
Both of these examples provide us with two general cases in which the ex officio
exception may apply: (1) a joint venture by two municipalities (or counties) to provide
services to citizens of both municipalities (or counties), and (2) the creation of an
oversight board comprised of elected officials of each municipality. In light of these
examples, the ex officio exception is narrow, indeed. However, the intent of the
exception, in light of these cases, is clear. The exception appears to exist to allow elected
officials of a unit of state government to enjoy membership on a governing board for
purposes of furthering or protecting the interests of each respective member’s
municipality. At least, that could have been the Segars-Andrews court’s conclusion had
it chosen not to cherry-pick a loosely defined exception to an important constitutional
rule and to allow that exception to dictate the rule. That is precisely what the SegarsAndrews court did.
In light of the cases discussed above involving when it is appropriate to employ
the ex officio exception, it should come as no surprise why the court held the way it did.
First, it is unreasonable to conclude that all of the staff attorneys, law clerks, and justices
at the supreme court overlooked the Welling case. A simple Keyciting or Shepardizing
would have picked up the case because it cited directly to Ashmore, the case to which the
Segars-Andrews court cites as its primary authority. If we presume, which I think we
must, that the court was aware of Welling, then we must also conclude that their omission
of that case was intentional. If, then, the court intentionally sidestepped Welling in favor
of Ashmore’s dicta and Miller’s inapposite separation of powers analysis, perhaps the
court embellished a bit when it referred to the ex officio exception as “firmly
established.”238
Not only did the court’s dual office holding analysis prevent Segars-Andrews’
most obvious constitutional claim from succeeding, but the Segars-Andrews decision also
greatly expanded the once narrow ex officio exception to the point of perhaps
undermining the constitutional provision itself. Whether or not the ex officio exception’s
expansion will affect substantive change in the way the General Assembly crafts its laws
remains to be seen. However, it is certainly appropriate to ask whether such an
expansion of a narrow exception threatens to dictate the constitutional rule itself. What
the court did in Segars-Andrews was allow the tail to wag the dog—a dangerous
precedent to set when interpreting constitutional provisions.
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C. Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence

Separation of powers and judicial independence will be discussed together. In
response to Segars-Andrews’ argument that membership of sitting legislators on the
JMSC violates separation of powers principles, the court concluded that article V, section
27239 neither expressly nor by clear implication prevents legislative membership.240 The
court continued by holding that “[t]he separation of powers argument that the Legislature
is ‘both creating and executing’ law must be rejected.”241 In so doing, the court readily
admitted that the JMSC has the power to decide “in a political context a matter
concomitantly determined by the judicial branch.”242 Next, the court acknowledged that
“judicial independence considerations are implicated.”243 In the very next sentence,
however, the court retreated by refusing to intervene in what it decided was a purely
political question.244 Invoking the political question doctrine, the court emphasized that it
“will not rule on questions that are exclusively or predominantly political in nature rather
than judicial.”245
In general, when making a determination regarding whether a particular challenge
presents a bona fide legal challenge or a nonjusticiable political question, the court
considers its constitutional duty to review actions of the General Assembly,246 but the
court also considers the extent to which adjudication of a question would place the court
“in conflict with a coequal branch of government.”247 The United States Supreme Court
has characterized the political question doctrine as “one of political questions, not one of
political cases.”248 To be sure, the distinction is not always clear. Nonetheless, the Court
should not be “misled by mere pretenses,”249 and it must not abdicate its “solemn duty . .
. to look at the substance of things whenever [it] enter[s] upon the inquiry whether the
legislature has transcended the limits of its authority.”250
Of particular interest, here is the fact that the South Carolina Supreme Court’s two
authoritative cases addressing nonjusticiable political questions have one element in
common: the JMSC.251 That the court’s modern political question jurisprudence can be
found exclusively within the two cases in which the JMSC is the defendant might imply
simply that the two cases have been the most ripe in which to discuss the doctrine. Of
course, it might also be reasonably inferred that the court has employed the doctrine as a
shield to protect the court from having to face off with their legislative coequals across
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the street in the state capitol.252 In either event, the fact remains that the two main
opinions from the court addressing the scope of nonjusticiable political questions are in
the context of constitutional challenges directed at the JMSC.
In Segars-Andrews, the South Carolina Supreme Court preoccupied itself with the
contention that the JMSC per se violated separation of powers.253 What the court failed
to do was delve deeper into the cause and effect relationship between an action of the
JMSC on the one hand, and the reaction of South Carolina judges on the other. That is,
when does a political decision of the JMSC regarding one judge create a ripple effect
throughout the South Carolina judiciary such that judges charged with conducting
themselves according to the Judicial Canons as interpreted and applied by the judicial
branch feel obligated to reconsider their behavior in light of how the JMSC has
interpreted or might interpret the Canons? The court in Segars-Andrews focused too
much on validating the right of the JMSC under the constitution to use whatever criteria
it desires to evaluate candidates. As a result, the court neglected to seriously consider the
absurdity of its own hypothetical, in which a court or commission within the judicial
branch finds a judge guilty of misconduct by violating the Canons, but where the JMSC
nonetheless decides to ignore those conclusions and find the judge qualified.254
Such a hypothetical is far less probable and implicates far fewer independence
concerns for the legislative branch than does a set of facts similar to the Segars-Andrews
case. For example, what is the likelihood that the politically accountable legislators on
the JMSC are going to risk their seats by trying to explain to their constituents why they
decided to ignore a prior finding made by the judicial branch that one of its own judges is
guilty of misconduct? Contrast that likelihood with the likelihood that the SegarsAndrews ruling will be perceived as a carte blanche to impose even higher restrictions on
judges than those required under the Canons. This is not merely a likelihood—it is a
promise from the mouth of Senator McConnell himself. Immediately after the court
handed down its opinion, Senator McConnell spoke to reporters outside the courtroom.255
On Wednesday, March 24, 2010, The Post and Courier newspaper reported this:
McConnell, R-Charleston, also called it a victory for higher standards for
state judges. “This is a green light to us that we can have higher standards
and that we can impose those higher standards,” he said. “Judges in the
family court, they’re judge and jury there. A judge in the family court has
broad discretion. And there is no assurance in South Carolina that you’re
going to be a judge for life.”256
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How far legislators are willing to go in light of this “green light” is unclear. What
is clear, however, is that legislators are unwilling to relinquish any control over the
process anytime soon.
It is axiomatic that South Carolina’s judges and justices are elected by the General
Assembly.257 It is also axiomatic that only the JMSC has the constitutional authority to
submit qualified applicants’ names to the General Assembly.258 What remains to be seen
is how the South Carolina Supreme Court has given anything more than lip service to the
notion of a constitutionally mandated independent judiciary. The court cannot expect
judges to take comfort in the fact that they may still be deemed qualified for reelection
even in light of a reprimand from the court itself, while these same judges are now
wondering which political impulse will provide the tainted lens through which Senator
McConnell and other legislators on the JMSC will view a set of facts and haphazardly
and inconsistently apply its own fickle interpretations of the Canons. Where can a
current judge go to obtain an ethics opinion, if not from experts like Professors Crystal
and Freeman? Should their inquiries, instead, be directed to the JMSC itself? Can we as
a sovereign political entity with a stake in the independent decision making abilities of
our judges, afford the high price of allowing political whim to triumph over sound, wellreasoned interpretations of judicial ethics? And, most importantly, will the next judge
that encounters a disgruntled litigant rule out of reason or trepidation? Once a reasonable
doubt exists about the answer to this last question, “judicial independence” means naught.
D.

Confronting the Elephant259 Head On

Judicial independence is, indeed, the “[t]he elephant in the room.”260 The
Constitution of South Carolina provides for an independent judiciary.261 To be
“independent” means to be free from dependence on another’s authority and, most
importantly, not subject to external control or rule. . . .”262 This definition of
“independent” has not changed since April 21, 1970, the date that the framers of article I,
section 8 redrafted the separation of powers clause precisely as it existed previously in
article I, section 14.263 To quote from the seminal case by Chief Justice Marshall: “It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that
rule. . . . This is of the very essence of judicial duty.”264 Unfortunately, South Carolina’s
Marbury moment has come and gone, and the reality in South Carolina is simple: It’s
politics as usual in the state capitol.
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E.

Solutions

All is not lost, however. If change is to come, it must come from the people, for
at least in South Carolina, the state supreme court has declined the invitation. All
political power is vested in and derived from the people only; therefore, the people have
the right at all times to modify their form of government.265 As stated at the beginning of
this Article, we propose solutions. These solutions are necessarily limited to the two
states we have focused on in this Article because South Carolina and Virginia remain the
only states whose judicial selection process continues to be dominated exclusively by
their legislatures. First, in South Carolina, the state must adopt reform to the JMSC as it
currently exists. Title 2, Chapter 19 of the South Carolina Code266 dealing with the
JMSC should be amended: (1) to preclude legislative membership;267 (2) to raise the cap
on the number of qualified applicants’ names submitted to the General Assembly from
three to no fewer than ten; and (3) to require the JMSC to give substantial weight to
decisions of the court of appeals, the South Carolina Supreme Court, or ethics
commissions within the judicial branch.268
The first measure—precluding legislative members from the JMSC—would cure
the constitutional dual office holding violation and ensure that politics are kept as far
removed from the decisionmaking process as practicable. Additionally, it would lend
more credibility to the JMSC’s decisions. The second measure—raising the cap on the
number of qualified applicants’ names submitted to the General Assembly from three to
no fewer than ten—is designed to increase the possibility that more minority applicants
will be qualified by the JMSC and submitted for consideration by the General Assembly.
Many have characterized the current system, where the JMSC may submit no more than
three candidates’ names, as the “steak and two hamburgers” method.269 That is, the
JMSC will pick the top candidate of the three, and the remaining two candidates are
lesser-qualified applicants who stand little if any chance of garnering a sufficient number
of votes in the legislature. Expanding the number of qualified candidates put forth by
JMSC to the legislature would mandate a more detailed explanation and raise public
skepticism if the increased slate still included no or a bare minimum number of minority
candidates. The third measure would require the JMSC to give “substantial weight” to
the ethics decisions of tribunals within the judicial branch. “Substantial weight” means
that the JMSC should view such decisions as persuasive rather than binding. Moreover,
the JMSC, if void of sitting legislators, may naturally be more apt to rely on the expertise
and credibility of such decisions. If enacted, any one of these measures would bring
much needed reform to the current JMSC. The desired result is for the General
Assemblies to relinquish control over the merit selection process, once and for all.
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Similar measures could be adopted or enacted in Virginia in an attempt to weed
politics out of the process, particularly, the adoption of a diverse qualifying commission
that includes individuals outside of the state’s legislature.
While Professor Ware raises legitimate concerns of elitism resulting from
disproportionate influence by members of the Bar,270 surely NO input from members of
the state Bar is equally dangerous. It is hard to identify a group better suited to give
input on necessary judicial temperament of a judicial candidate, legal acumen regarding
an understanding of the law, and the required independent nature of their colleagues who
will be chosen as a judge, than those who practice before the courts and among the
candidates. The exclusion of any meaningful input by members of the state Bar in both
South Carolina and Virginia identifies a glaring weakness in judicial selection in both
states. Ideally, this commission would be comprised of members of the Bar, members of
the legislature, and members at-large who would reflect the common man’s approach to
the court system. The lack of a truly diverse qualifying commission in both South
Carolina and Virginia detracts significantly from their processes of judicial selection, and
this simple solution may cure many criticisms of the current system, thereby
depoliticizing a worthy selection process. For as the 2010 Brennan Center report
concluded, “[m]ore diverse Commissions end up nominating more diverse slates of
candidates.”271
CONCLUSION
This Article has presented a brief historical sketch of the evolution of judicial
selection in Virginia272 and South Carolina,273 culminating in the recent and controversial
case involving former South Carolina Family Court Judge F.P. “Charlie” SegarsAndrews. In South Carolina, plenary control over the judicial election process remained
in the General Assembly until 1997,274 at which time the new constitutional entity known
as the Judicial Merit Selection Commission came into existence.275 Although the
constitutional amendment submitted to the people for ratification did not state that sitting
legislators would comprise a majority of the JMSC’s membership,276 the enabling
legislation passed contemporaneously with the amendment provided for legislative
dominance.277 In contrast, Virginia’s constitution has in the past provided for judicial
selection via popular vote, but the legislative bodies chose to return to a process by which
judicial selection is controlled exclusively by the legislature. As a result of the structures
in both Virginia and South Carolina, both states lend themselves to criticism and attack as
demonstrated in the Segars-Andrews case.
In 2009, a disgruntled litigant whose ethics complaint against Segars-Andrews
had been dismissed by both the South Carolina Court of Appeals and the Commission on
Judicial Conduct filed a complaint with the JMSC, raising the same issues addressed by
270
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both the court and the commission.278 After considering the complainant’s case, the
JMSC voted 7–3 to find Segars-Andrews unqualified to continue serving as a judge.279
In her petition to the South Carolina Supreme Court,280 Segars-Andrews argued multiple
constitutional grounds to invalidate the JMSC.281 The court subsequently dismissed the
complaint after finding none of Segars-Andrews’ claims to have merit.282 In its opinion,
the court held that the ex officio exception applied to Segars-Andrews’ dual office
holding argument, but the court was not straightforward in its assessment of the viability
of this exception.283 The court’s painstaking attempt to enlarge this dormant exception to
cover the composition of the JMSC raises doubts about the extent of the exception’s
scope and the resulting effect on the constitutional rule prohibiting dual office holding.284
Segars-Andrews’ separation of powers and judicial independence arguments were
not enough to persuade the court to consider them fully.285 Instead, the court invoked the
political question doctrine and declined to scrutinize the decision of the JMSC.286 The
court’s refusal to address the separation of powers concerns implicated by JMSC
members’ interpretation and application of the Canons leaves judges at the mercy of
disgruntled litigants like Mr. Simpson.287 Moreover, judges are left wondering whose
interpretations of the Canons they should follow—the courts’ or the JMSC’s?288 When
such uncertainty leads to a judge potentially ruling for or against a party out of fear of the
JMSC’s reaction, or out of uncertainty as to the applicability of the Canons, an
independent judiciary exists only in form, not in substance.289
It is instructive to look at Virginia’s system of judicial selection in light of the
decision in Segars-Andrews, given that Virginia and South Carolina are the only two
states that incorporate a process of judicial selection vested exclusively in the General
Assembly of the state. The lessons learned from Segars-Andrews and the concerns it
raises apply equally to the process in Virginia.
In the absence of the court’s willingness to address the pressing issues
surrounding judicial reform, the bench and the bar must galvanize the people and
encourage them to petition their representatives to enact meaningful change. We propose
four solutions to be adopted in both states: (1) preclude sitting legislators from
membership, at least in the majority, on any merit selection commission; (2) raise the cap
in South Carolina on the number of qualified applicants submitted to the General
Assembly from the current three to at least ten, or in Virginia place a reasonable limit on
the number of names submitted to the legislative delegation from which they may select;
278
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(3) require any merit selection commission, including the JMSC in South Carolina, to
give “substantial weight” to ethics decisions rendered by a tribunal within the judicial
department; and (4) include the state’s Bar association in the selection process.290 Real
reform of South Carolina’s and Virginia’s legislatively dominated systems will take time.
However, while advocating for improvement, let us also remember that these systems
have already proven to be effective in increasing diversity when compared with other
states’ judicial selection processes. To borrow from Winston Churchill,291 it may be the
case that South Carolina’s and Virginia’s systems are the worst – except for all the others
that have been tried.
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